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COMBINING MONETARY AND SOCIAL SANCTIONS TO PROMOTE
COOPERATION
CHARLES NOUSSAIR and STEVEN TUCKER*
We employ an experimental approach to consider the impact of a combination of
formal and informal sanctions on contribution levels for a speciﬁc type of public good.
We ﬁnd that when both sanctions are available, contributions and overall welfare are
higher than when only one of the two sanctioning systems is available. The availability
of an array of sanctions of varying severity appears to enhance welfare. (JEL C92)
I. INTRODUCTION
When externalities are present, private self-
interest and overall group welfare may be at
odds, with individuals having incentives to
take actions that lower overall group payoff.
Examples of situations of interest to econo-
mists where tension between individual and
group-level incentives arises include cartel
agreements, negative externalities from pollu-
tion, depletion of a common pool resource,
and the private provision of public goods.
In such cases, there are potential overall wel-
fare gains from the creation of a social norm
1
and the imposition of a sanctioning system
that penalizes behavior that deviates from
the norm and imposes costs on the group.
2
The sanctions are intended to lower the return
on self-interested behavior and increase the in-
centive to follow the behavioral norm.
Frequently observed types of sanctions that
impose tangible costs of money or time on
offendersinclude ﬁnes,incarceration,andeco-
nomic boycotts. Inthis article werefer tosanc-
tions where the cost is tangible to the punished
actor as formal sanctions. Although such for-
mal punishment systems can create strong
incentives to behave in the group interest,
one of their potential drawbacks is that it
costly to apply the sanction to enforce the sys-
tem. Both sanctioned offenders and those who
pay for the process that imposes the sanction
bear the cost. If the marginal beneﬁt to the
group from the increase in cooperative behav-
ior does not more than offset the deadweight
loss of implementing the sanction regime, the
sanctioning system is inefﬁcient.
As in Blau (1964), sanctions can also be in-
formal in nature. In this article, we use the
term informal sanctions to refer to penalties
that do not impose tangible costs on the of-
fender, though they may decrease his or her
utility. Informal sanctions such as social
disapproval, ostracism, gossip, peer pressure,
or public embarrassment of offenders are
often applied to try to alter behavior and
in many cases appear to be effective.
3 These
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1. Coleman (1990) characterizes this situation as the
existence of demand for a behavioral norm. See Elster
(1989) for a discussion of the origins and beneﬁts of social
norms.
2. Severaleconomic modelshave investigatedthe con-
sequences of social pressure on economic behavior. See,
for example, Akerlof (1980) and Lindbeck et al. (1999).
Elster (1989) distinguishes between guilt, an internal type
of pressure and shame, an external type of social pressure,
as forces promoting prosocial behavior. Labor econo-
mists, such as Kandel and Lazear (1992) and Barron
and Gjerde (1997), have modeled the effect of peer pres-





VCM: Voluntary Contributions Mechanism
3. See Homans (1961) for a discussion of the role of
sanctions in enforcing social norms.
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649sanctions may originate with a public author-
ity or with private individuals or organiza-
tions. They may be well organized or arise
spontaneously. Such sanctions are typically
not costly to apply. However, to be successful,
theyrequireoffenderstoexhibitchangesinbe-
havior in response to the sanction, an assump-
tion that is more questionable with informal
than with formal sanctions.
There are many examples in the ﬁeld where
both formal and informal sanctions are used
in tandem to attempt to deter behavior that
is viewed as antisocial, suggesting that infor-
mal sanctions have an additional beneﬁt, even
when a formal sanction is in effect. For exam-
ple,policiesagainstdrugabuse,drunkdriving,
littering, and selling cigarettes to minors in-
clude formal ofﬁcial legal restrictions as well
as informational campaigns designed to create
an informal sanction against those breaking
the law. In corporations and academic institu-
tions, failure to perform a level of service
activities viewed as appropriate may be penal-
ized ﬁnancially with lower salary increases or
denial of promotion, but may also engender
expressions of disapproval and a degree of so-
cial ostracism. In organizations such as the
military and at some academic institutions,
honor codes exist that can coincide with for-
mal policies. One reason that these institutions
label cheating and theft as honor code viola-
tions may be to create a social prohibition
against them in addition to the explicit penal-
ties in force. The publishing of the police crime
blotter in local newspapers creates embarrass-
ment for offenders in addition to any legal
penalties they face. Tyler (1990) argues that
social pressure, rather then the prospect of be-
ing penalized for noncompliance, is the major
reason that laws are obeyed.
In this article, we report the results from
a simple experiment that demonstrates that
a sanctioning system combining formal and
informal penalties can be more effective than
a system where only one type of sanction is
available. The context within which we
study the power of sanctions is the Voluntary
Contributions Mechanism (VCM), a game
that experimental economists have extensively
used to investigate the conﬂict between self-
interest and group-interest. Each individual
simultaneously selects a fraction of his or
her endowment to contribute to a group ac-
count. At the group optimum, each individual
contributes his or her entire endowment to the
group account, whereas the dominant strategy
foreachplayeristocontributezero.Theallure
of the VCM game for our study derives pri-
marily from two of its properties. First, the
game provides the researcher with a simple
measure of the level of group orientation of
individual decisions, the percentage of endow-
ment contributed to the group account. Sec-
ond, because an extensive literature has
studied the effect of various manipulations
on the level of contributions, the results can
be directly interpreted within the context of
a large body of research.
The experiment reported here follows and
builds on previous research that studies the ef-
fect of sanctioning systems on contribution
levels in the VCM game. Yamagishi (1986),
Fehr and Gaechter (2000), Falk et al.
(2000), Sefton et al. (2000), Masclet et al.
(2003), and Bowles et al. (2001) all ﬁnd that
when a structure exists for agents to reduce
the monetary payments to low contributors,
agents will use the sanctioning system, even
when the sanctioner bears some of the cost.
Average contribution levels rise sharply when
monetary sanctions are available. Gaechter
and Fehr (1999), Rege and Telle (2001), and
Masclet et al. (2003) have shown that informal
sanctions, allowing individuals to display ap-
proval and disapproval of other group mem-
bers’ decisions, can also increase contribution
levels and earnings.
4
The question we consider herein is whether
the simultaneousavailability of bothmonetary
and nonmonetary sanctions can generate





of informal mechanisms is that they are of
low cost to apply. On the other hand, formal
4. GaechterandFehr(1999)reportquestionnairedata
indicating that cooperation and free riding trigger a high
degree of approval and disapproval, respectively. Also, in
an experiment in which familiarity between subjects is cre-
ated before they play the VCM game, contributions are
revealed publicly, and discussion takes place after the
game is played, high contribution levels are observed.
Rege and Telle (2001) ﬁnd that revealing the identity of
each group member publicly in a way that allows him
or her to be associated with his or her contribution
increases average contribution levels. Hollaender (1990)
and Bowles and Gintis (2001) have modeled the effect
of a disutility of disapproval on contributions and obtain
positive contributions as an equilibrium property.
650 ECONOMIC INQUIRYsanctioningsystemsincludedirectandtangible
penalties for violating recommended behav-
ior and therefore arguably provide more
powerful incentives for compliance. If the
combined system retains favorable properties
of each type of system, it may attain higher
welfare than either system on its own. Under
a combined system, the monetary sanction
need not function both as a communication
and as a punishment mechanism. When com-
munication of disapproval is sufﬁcient to in-
crease contributions, informal sanctions can
be employed. However, when communication
of disapproval alone is insufﬁcient to induce
high contributions, the group can resort to
monetary sanctions.
Our protocol is based on the experimental
design of Fehr and Gaechter (2000) and is de-
scribed in detail in sectionII. In our MP (mon-
etary punishment) treatment, subjects may,
after observing the amount each member of
the group contributes, pay money from their
own earnings to reduce the earnings of any
group members they wish. We observe that
players employ sanctions to punish free-riders
even when their application is inconsistent
with subgame perfection, and the existence
of the sanctioning system results in large
increases in contribution levels. Our NP (non-
monetary punishment) treatment is based on
the NP treatment of Masclet et al. (2003),
who study behavior in a game that is identical
to that of Fehr and Gaechter (2000), except
that the sanction imposes costs neither on
the ‘‘punisher’’ nor on the ‘‘punished.’’ The
sanction consists of a mechanism to commu-
nicate a level of approval or disapproval,
which can be thought of as a rating, of other
group members’ decisions. We replicate the
ﬁndings of Masclet et al. (2003) that the avail-
ability of informal sanctions increases contri-
butions. The informal sanction is fairly
effective in generating high contributions,
though average contributions and welfare
are lower than when monetary sanctions are
available.
In our BP (both punishments) treatment,
the principal treatment of interest in the arti-
cle, both types of sanction are available to
punish other group members. We ﬁnd that af-
ter several periods of play, the BP treatment
generates higher average contribution levels
and overall welfare than either the MP or
the NP systems. Despite the fact that fewer
sanctions are applied and therefore sanction-
ing costs are lower under BP than under MP,
BP results in higher average contributions.
Thus, we demonstrate, at least for our partic-
ulardecisionsituation andclass ofsanctioning
systems, that a combination of formal and in-
formal sanctions is more effective than either
system alone. The next section describes the
design and procedures of our experiment, sec-
tion II presents the results, and section IV pro-




church, New Zealand. Each treatment, MP,
NP,andBP,wasineffectinthreeofthesessions.
Subjects were recruited from ﬁrst-year under-
graduate economics and mathematics courses.
Some of the subjects had previously partici-
patedineconomicexperiments,butallwerein-
experienced with the voluntary contributions
mechanism.Eachsubjecttookpartinonlyasin-
gle session of the study. The experiment was
computerized and used the z-Tree software
package, developed at the Institute for Empir-
icalResearchinEconomicsattheUniversityof
Zurich.
5 The currency used for decisions in the
experiment was called ECU (Experimental
Currency Unit). Subjects’ earnings were paid
in New Zealand dollars (NZ$1 ¼ US$0.4) at
theendoftheexperimentaccordingtoaprede-
termined and publicly known conversion rate
betweenECUsanddollars.Theconversionrate




and subjects earned on average 390 ECU.
Each session included 12 participants that
were separated into 3 groups of size 4. Group
assignments remained the same for the entire
session. That is, ‘‘partner’’ matching condi-
tions were in effect. The computer terminals
corresponding to a speciﬁc group were dis-
persed throughout the laboratory and subjects
were randomly assigned to a group by their
choice of terminal on entering the room for
the session.
Each session consisted of 15 plays of the
same two-stage game. We refer to each play
as a period. The total number of periods in
5. See Fischbacher (1999) for a discussion of the
z-Tree software package.
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period of the session were identical was com-
mon knowledge. In all three treatments, in the
ﬁrst stage of a period, activity proceeded as
follows. Each subject was endowed with 20
ECU at the beginning of the stage. Afterward,
subjects simultaneously decided how many
ECUs from their endowment to contribute
to a group account. To do so, they entered
a number between 0 and 20 in the appropriate
ﬁeld on their computer screen. For every ECU
that a subject contributed, each of the four
members of his or her group received a pay-
ment of 0.4 ECU. All ECUs from a subject’s
endowment that were not contributed were
also paid to the subject. Contributions of all
members of a subject’s group were displayed
on the screen without a subject identiﬁer
and in a random order that changed each
period.
The second stage of the period differed be-
tween the three treatments. In all treatments,
at the beginning of the second stage, the exper-
imenter informed all subjects of the amount
each of the other three members of the group
contributed. Once informed of the contribu-
tion decisions of the other group members,
subjects had the opportunity to assign punish-
ment points to each group member. Because
the information corresponding to other mem-
bers appeared on subjects’ computer screens
without identiﬁcation and in an order that
changed each period, it was impossible to
track an individual subject’s contribution de-
cision from one period to the next, or to target
one speciﬁcally for punishment beyond the
current period. The point allocation systems
for the three treatments are described in detail
next.
In MP, subjects had the opportunity to re-
duce the earnings of any other group members
through the assignment of monetary punish-
ment points. They could assign 0 to 10 punish-
ment points to each of the other members of
their group. Each monetary point a subject re-
ceived from any other member of the group
reduced his or her earnings from the ﬁrst stage
by 10% with a maximum possible reduction of
100%. Subjects assigning points also incurred
monetary costs. Table 1 illustrates the sched-
ule of costs, in terms of ECU, of allocating
monetary points to a particular group mem-
ber. The row titled Punishment points illus-
trates the possible range of points that
subjecticouldassign tosubject j(0–10points).
The Cost of punishment row represents the
cost to subject i for the sum of monetary pun-
ishment points allocated to subject j. cj is the
contribution of subject j. Letting Pij represent
the points that subject i allocates to subject j,
and C(Pij) the cost of the points that i assigns
to j, the total cost of monetary point alloca-
tion for subject i for a period is given by P3
j¼1 CðPijÞ. The cost schedule is the same
as the one that Fehr and Gaechter (2000)
andMascletetal. (2003)employ andwascom-
mon knowledge to participants.
6 In the MP
treatment, subject i’s earnings in a period, in
terms of ECU, equaled
Ei ¼
 





















NP was identical to MP except that punish-
ment points did not affect the earnings of sub-
jectsassigningorreceivingpoints.Eachsubject
had the opportunity to allocate 0 to 10 non-
monetary punishment points to each other
group member. The nonmonetary points were
describedinthesamemannerasinMascletetal.
(2003), as representing a level of disapproval of
TABLE 1
Levels of Punishment and Associated Costs for the Punishing Subject
Punishment points: Pij 0 1 2 3 4 56789 1 0
Cost of punishment: C(Pij)0124691 21 62 02 53 0
6. We use the same cost function for punishment that
Fehr and Gaechter (2000) and Masclet et al. (2003) em-
ploy. The use of the same parametric structure as previous
authors have used allows us to verify that our procedures
conform sufﬁciently to those that previous researchers
have employed to generate similar results. This allows
our results to more easily be interpreted in the context
of the previous literature. The willingness to punish and
therefore the effect of the availability of punishment
may depend on how costly it is to punish other group
members.
652 ECONOMIC INQUIRYa subject’s contribution decision in the ﬁrst
stage. An allocationof 10 nonmonetary points
corresponded to the maximum level of disap-
proval and 0 nonmonetary points to the mini-
mum level.
7 Subject i’s earnings in the NP
treatment were equal to




In the BP treatment, both the monetary and
nonmonetary punishment opportunities were
available to all agents. Individual i’s earnings
were determined bytheformulain(1). The op-
portunity to allocate the two types of points
occurred simultaneously. The rules of BP were
otherwise identical to NP and MP.
In all treatments, after subjects made their
punishment point allocation decisions, each
subject was notiﬁed of the total number of
points he or she received for the period. In
all three treatments, a subject learned only
the total number of points of each type that
he or she had been given, and not the assign-
ment of points from individual group mem-
bers. At the end of each period in all
treatments,thecomputerdisplayedasummary
of results for both stages to each subject. The
display included the subject’s own earnings
from the ﬁrst stage, own total points received,
own cost of points allocated (for MP), own
overall earnings for both stages, own contri-
bution, and total group contribution. Once
subjects had recorded their period results on
a record sheet, the computer continued to
the next period. It was common knowledge
that exactly 15 periods would be played. There
were no practice periods at the beginning of
the sessions.
The subgame perfect equilibrium in MP is
unique. In the second stage, all players assign
zero points to all other players. In the ﬁrst
stage, all players contribute zero to the group
account. The threat to punish is not credible
because it is costly to the punisher, and there-
fore the best response in the ﬁrst stage is to
contribute zero. The return to an individual
for each ECU contributed to the group ac-
count is 0.4 ECU, whereas the return on each
ECU not contributed is 1 ECU. The equilib-
rium payoff for each agent is 20 ECU for a to-
tal group payoff of 80.
8
In BP and NP, there are many subgame
perfect equilibria, but all of them involve zero
contribution to the group account by all play-
ers. In NP, any level and distribution of point
allocation in the second stage is compatible
with subgame perfection because the alloca-
tion of points does not change the payoff to
any player. In the ﬁrst stage the best response
of each player, regardless of beliefs about the
second stage, is to contribute zero to the group
account. In BP, any level and distribution of
nonmonetary point allocation is compatible
with a subgame perfect equilibrium, but only
zero allocation of monetary points to each
player by each player is consistent with sub-
game perfection. In all subgame perfect equi-
libria in BP, all players contribute zero ECU
to the group account. Thus in both NP and
BP, as in MP, each agent earns 20 ECU in
equilibrium. In all three games, the socially
optimal outcome can only be attained if each
subjectcontributestheentireendowmentof20
ECU to the group account. In this event, each
subject earns 32 ECU for a group payoff of
128 ECU.
III. RESULTS
The presentation of the results is divided in-
to three parts. Section A describes the overall
difference in contribution levels and welfare
between the three sanctioning systems,
whereas sections B and C explore patterns
in the BP data. Sections B and C discuss
the assignment and the effect of sanctions,
respectively.
7. We chose to designate the nonmonetary punish-
ment points as indicating disapproval rather than ap-
proval, and to construct a setting where the benchmark
of zero points can be expected to be associated with no
disapproval, to preserve the analogy with the informal
sanctions such as the examples described in the introduc-
tion. These informal sanctions are ‘‘bads’’ from the point
ofviewofrecipientsofthesanctions.However,itmaywell
be the case that nonmonetary ‘‘approval’’ and ‘‘disap-
proval’’ points would be used differently and have differ-
ent effects from each other. Sefton et al. (2002) show that
when agents are permitted to pay from their own earnings
toincreasetheearningsofothersafterobservingtheircon-
tributions, the positive effect on contributions is not as
strong as when agents can pay to reduce the earnings of
others.
8. Fehr and Schmidt (1999) show that if some players
have disutility for differences in the earnings that they and
others receive, there may be subgame perfect equilibria
with positive contribution and sanctioning levels in MP.
The same argument also applies to BP.
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Figure 1 illustrates the time series of contri-
bution levels in the MP, NP and BP treat-
ments, averaged over the nine groups that
make up each treatment. The complete group
contribution data for each group and each pe-
riod are given in Table A1 in the appendix.
Figure 1 indicates that in period 1, before
any of the sanctions could be applied, average
contribution rates are similar under all three
regimes, ranging between 55% and 62% of to-
tal endowment. Until period 6, average contri-
butions are greatest in MP, followed by BP
and NP. After period 6, contribution rates
are highest in the BP treatment, followed by
MP, and ﬁnally NP. In these later periods,
the contribution rate in NP falls consistently,
as the nonmonetary sanction appears to lose
effectiveness over time when not backed up
with a monetary sanction. In MP, the contri-
bution rate is fairly stable over time. The dif-
ference between contribution levels in MP and
BP suggests that the existence of a nonmone-
tary sanction increases contribution levels
when a monetary sanctioning system already
exists.
Table 2 contains the results of pooled var-
iance t-tests of the hypotheses that average
contribution rates are equal across treatments
for the entire 15 periods, the ﬁrst 5periods, the
last 5 periods, and the last period of the exper-
iment. The unit of observation is the group,
yieldingnineobservationspertreatment,three
groupsineachofthreesessions.Intheﬁrstﬁve
periods, the average contribution is no differ-
ent between any two of the three sanctioning
mechanisms at the 5% level of signiﬁcance.
However, over the entire course of the exper-
iment, in the last ﬁve periods alone, or in pe-
riod 15 alone, average contributions are
signiﬁcantly higher in BP and in MP than in
NP at the p < 0.005 level. For the same time
intervals, average contributions are higher in
BP than in MP, though the differences are
not signiﬁcant.
However, higher contribution rates do not
necessarily imply higher welfare for the
group. In MP and potentially in BP, the sanc-
tioning system is costly to apply, in that pun-
ishment reduces the earnings of both the
TABLE 2




Average Contribution Average Earnings
t-Statistic p-Value t-Statistic p-Value
Periods 1–15 BP ¼ NP 4.43 ,0.005 1.56 ,0.1
BP ¼ MP 0.41 Not sig. 1.04 Not sig.
MP ¼ NP 2.99 ,0.005 0.08 Not sig.
Periods 1–5 BP ¼ NP 0.99 Not sig. 1.27 ,0.005
BP ¼ MP 0.51 Not sig. 0.00 Not sig.
MP ¼ NP 1.35 ,0.1 1.25 Not sig.
Period 11–15 BP ¼ NP 6.36 ,0.005 3.51 ,0.005
BP ¼ MP 1.23 Not sig 1.96 ,0.05
MP ¼ NP 3.78 ,0.005 0.87 Not sig.
Period 15 BP ¼ NP 7.31 ,0.005 2.81 ,0.01
BP ¼ MP 1.00 Not sig. 1.65 ,0.1
MP ¼ NP 5.30 ,0.005 0.67 Not sig.
FIGURE 1




























654 ECONOMIC INQUIRYsanctioner and the sanctioned. Nonmonetary
sanctions impose no such costs on either
party. Figure 2 shows the average earnings
by period in the three treatments. It indicates
that during the ﬁrst ﬁve periods, average
earnings are highest in NP, in which actual
contribution rates are lowest, but in which
there are no enforcement costs. In periods 6
and later, BP generates higher earnings than
either of the other two systems.
The pooled variance t-tests reported in the
two rightmost columns of Table 2 reveal the
level of signiﬁcance of the differences in earn-
ings between treatments. In the ﬁrst 5 periods,
as well as over the entire 15-period horizon,
the average earnings in no pair of treatments
differ signiﬁcantly. However, for the last ﬁve
periods, we can reject the hypotheses that av-
erage earnings in BP are less than or equal to
those in NP at the p< 0.005 level andthat they
are less than or equal to MP at the p < 0.05
level. In period 15, average earnings are signif-
icantly greater in BP than in NP (p < 0.01) and
in MP (p < 0.1). In both period 15 and the last
ﬁve periods, earnings are no different in MP
than in NP. Thus, after 10 periods the BP sys-
tem is superior in terms of both average con-
tribution and average welfare levels, although
the effect is statistically signiﬁcant only for
welfare.
B. The Assignment of Sanctions
Figure 3 illustrates the behavior over time
of the average per-capita number of punish-
ment points assigned in each treatment. It
reveals that under NP, ever more nonmone-
tary sanctions are used even as contribution
levels fall over time. However, under MP
and BP, there is no overall trend over time
in average punishment levels. Under BP, less
monetary punishment is used than under
MP and less nonmonetary punishment is used
than under NP. The lower incidence of mon-
etary punishment in BP than in MP suggests
that the deadweight loss from enforcement
of the sanction is smaller.
9 The use of mone-
tary punishment in both MP and BP increases
in period 15, even though it can have no pos-
sible pecuniary beneﬁt to the punisher because
it comes too late to inﬂuence the behavior of
the punished. The use of monetary sanctions
in the last period replicates a result reported
in Falk et al. (2000) and supports their conten-
tion that a main purpose of the sanctions is
nonstrategic.
Table 3 displays the number of both types
of points that individual agents receive. Each
cell indicates the number of instances in which
individuals received particular quantity com-
binations of monetary and nonmonetary
points. The data are divided into three groups.
The ﬁrst group consists of high contributors,
those who have contributed an amount
greater than or equal to the group average
in the current period. The second group is
FIGURE 2
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9. The loss from enforcing the sanctioning scheme has
two components. The ﬁrst is the cost of the points to the
punisher, which is calculated according to the function
given in Table 1. The second is the reduction in earnings
of the sanctioned party. Though BP involves a lower ex-
penditure on points than MP, each point is more costly to
thepunishedagentin BP,becauseaveragestage1earnings
are higher in BP. The average per capita cost to sanc-
tioners per period is 0.541 ECU in BP and 0.783 ECU
in MP. The average per capita cost from the reduction
in earnings of sanctioned individuals equals 1.565 in BP
and 2.491 in MP. Therefore, the total deadweight loss
from sanctions is lower in BP than in MP.
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between  c   5a n d c, where  c is the group av-
erage in the current period. The severe
offenders are those who contribute less than
 c   5.
The table illustrates three main points. The
ﬁrst is that punishment of both types is prin-
cipally directed at those who contribute less
than the group average. The second is that
sanctioning of severe offenders, with both
types of punishment, is much stronger than
for mild offenders.
10 The third is that the ap-
plication of formal sanctions is more concen-
trated on severe offenders than the informal
sanctions are. The average severe offender re-
ceived 2.5 points of monetary sanctions,
whereas mild offenders received on average
0.944 point, 37.8% as much as the severe
offenders. The 7.2% of players who were se-
vere offenders received 32.3% of all formal
sanctions. Just 5.6% of all mild offenders
but 27.8% of all severe offenders received at
least four monetary punishment points. In
contrast, severe offenders only received
23.4% of all informal sanctions. Mild
offenders were assigned on average 12.07 non-
monetary points, 59% of the 20.47 awarded on
average to severe offenders. No agent who re-
ceived zero nonmonetary points was assigned
any monetary points.
C. The Effect of Sanctions
Table 4 illustrates the effect of the receipt of
the two types of sanctions in BP. Each cell
indicates the net change in contributions from
period t to t þ 1 depending on the amount of
both monetary and nonmonetary punishment
received in period t. Those who receive zero
points of both types of sanction on average
lower their contribution. Those who receive
at least one monetary punishment point typi-
cally raise their contribution on average. Play-
ers who are assigned zero monetary sanctions
TABLE 3
Distribution of Sanctions Received, High Contributors, Mild Offenders, and
Severe Offenders
Range of Nonmonetary Points
[0, 5] [6, 10] [11, 15] [16, 20] [21, 25] [26, 30]
High contributors
Range of monetary points 0 304 20 5 2 NA NA
16 3 4 1 N A N A
21 4 5 2 N A 1
3 NA 1 NA NA 1 NA
4N A 1 1 N A N A N A
5 N A N A N AN AN AN A
Mild offenders
Range of monetary points 0 30 15 15 12 3 3
1 4 76 35 1
2 2 71 32 2
3N A 1 3 2 6 1
4N A 1 2 N A 2 N A
5 NA 2 NA NA 1 NA
Severe offenders
Range of monetary points 0 NA NA 3 2 NA 3
1 NA 1 NA 3 2 1
2N A 1 1 3 2 N A
3N A N A 1 1 1 1
4 N A N A1 3 N A3
5 N A N A1 1 N A1
10. These ﬁrst two patterns were noted by Fehr and
Gaechter (2000) for monetary sanctions and by Masclet
et al. (2003) for nonmonetary sanctions.
656 ECONOMIC INQUIRYincrease their contributions on average if they
receivemorethan10nonmonetarypoints.The
impression from the table is that receiving
greater monetary sanctions leads to greater
increases in contributions.
To evaluate the signiﬁcance of these effects
we estimate regression model (3) for the data
in BP. The estimates are shown in Table 5. Pkt
denotes the number of points k receives in pe-
riod t. The equations are estimated separately
forlowcontributors(thoseplayerskforwhom
ckt    c < 0) and high contributors (those for
whom ckt   c > 0). cktdenotes k’s contribution
in period t.
11 The equations are also estimated
forthepooleddata(labelledasAllinthetable)
from low and high contributors as well as
those for whom ckt    c ¼ 0.
As we have seen in the previous subsection,
the variables Pkt and ckt    c are correlated.
Both Pkt and ckt    c may have an effect on
cktþ1 – ckt. Players might exhibit more positive
net changes in contribution in response to
more punishment points as well as in response
to contributing a low amount relative to the
group average. This means a positive relation-
ship between sanctions and the subsequent net
change in contribution might be spurious,
when it is in fact the variable ckt    c that
affects bothPktandcktþ1–ckt.The correlation
between ckt    c and Pkt also means that both
cannot be used as independent variables in the
same equation. Instead we estimate,
MPkt ¼ b0 þ b1ðckt   cÞþgkt ð3aÞ
NPkt ¼ b2 þ b3ðckt   cÞþvkt ð3bÞ









MPkt and NPkt denote the number of mone-
tary and nonmonetary points, respectively,
that k receives in period t. The residual gkt
is the variation in punishment points that can-
not be explained with ckt    c. Thus, in equa-
tion (3c), a signiﬁcant coefﬁcient c1 indicates
that the variable MPkt is a determinant of
cktþ1   ckt, beyond any effect of ckt    c on
cktþ1   ckt.
TABLE 4
Change in Average Individual Contribution in Response to the Receipt of Points,
BP Treatment
Range of Nonmonetary Points Received in Period t




0  0.47 0.25  1.15 1.50 0.47  1 4.25
1–2 NA 1.66 1.59  0.43 2.46 2.30  0.40
3–4 NA n/a 0.75 3.75 5.33 4.40 6
>4 NA n/a 3.33 NA 5 5 6
TABLE 5
The Relationship between Points and Changes in Contribution Levels in BP
All/High/Low Contributors Constant: c0 Monetary Points: c1 NonMonetary Points: c2
All 0.325* (0.167) 0.355** (0.155)  0.007 (0.027)
High  0.847*** (0.251)  0.279 (0.488)  0.069 (0.058)
Low 2.207*** (0.355) 0.414** (0.179)  0.035 (0.043)
Notes: ***1% signiﬁcance level, **5% signiﬁcance level, *10% signiﬁcance level. Standard errors in parenthesis.
11. Masclet et al. (2003) argue that the receipt of both
monetary and nonmonetary punishment, in settings in
which only one of the punishment types was available,
increases contribution levels in the following period for
low contributors but not for high contributors. They pres-
ent evidence that high contributors lower their contribu-
tions more, the heavier the monetary sanctions they
receive.
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sanction has a signiﬁcantly positive effect
on average contributions overall and on low
contributors speciﬁcally. However, its effect
on high contributors is negative in sign,
though insigniﬁcant. Monetary sanctions in-
duce low contributors to increase their subse-
quent contributions. However, they appear to
some extent to trigger lower contributions in
the next period as negative reciprocation on
the partof high contributors. The level of non-
monetary sanctions assigned had an insigniﬁ-
cant effect on contributions in the following
period.
IV. DISCUSSION
The aggregate data reveal the following
patterns. All of the sanctioning systems are ef-
fective in attaining contribution levels higher
than would typically be observed in the ab-
sence of any system.
12 In the short run, NP,
which involves no cost of enforcement, is re-
markably effective in achieving high levels
of welfare. However, the ability of nonmone-
tarysanctionsalonetoenforce cooperativebe-
havior erodes over time, and it is doubtful that
in the absence of other incentives or punish-
ment options, nonmonetary sanctions could
sustain cooperation indeﬁnitely. In contrast,
contributions in MPincrease over the ﬁrst sev-
eral periods and average about 75% of total
endowment after period 3. Earnings in MP ex-
ceed the levels attained in NP after period 5. In
the long run, when compared to an informal
sanctioning system, the higher contributions
generated by a formal system more than offset
the inefﬁciencies from the monetary costs of
enforcing the sanction regime.
13
The BP system initially generates contribu-







system is superior to the other two systems in
terms of welfare as well as contribution levels.
FurthermoretheperformanceofBPrelativeto
the other two systems improves over time. The
deadweight loss of punishment is lower in BP
than in MP. Under BP, a smaller quantity of
monetarysanctionsisapplied,andthemarginal
returnfromexpenditureonsanctionsishigher.
Thus in this article we have provided evi-
dence that a system in which formal and infor-
mal sanctions are both available can be more
effectiveingeneratinghighearningsthaneither
typeseparately.Webelievethattheoriginofthe
superior performance of BP lies in its wider ar-
ray of sanctions, which provides agreater abil-
ity to nuance the disciplinary action taken
againstfreeriders.Itappearsthatnonmonetary
sanctions can function as a fairly effective sub-
stitute for monetary sanctions, at least in some
populations and in the short run. However,
nonmonetary sanctions can only increase the
contributions of those who can be swayed by
communication and social pressure.
12. We make this claim based on previous literature.
Fehr and Gaechter (2000) and Masclet et al. (2003) use the
same parameter values in their VCM games as we do here.
Both studies include some data in which there is no sanc-
tioning system and the partner matching protocol is in ef-
fect for the ﬁrst 10 periods of each session, and therefore
previoustreatmentssubjectsmighthaveparticipatedindo
not inﬂuence behavior. This data can be meaningfully
compared to data from this study. Fehr and Gaechter ob-
serve an average contribution of 38% of endowment, and
Masclet et al. report an average contribution of 31%. In
contrast we obtain average contributions of 74%, 44%,
and 78% of endowment in our MP, NP, and BP treat-
ments. Furthermore, both Fehr and Gaechter (2000)
and Masclet et al. (2003) report that after several periods
averageearnings are signiﬁcantly lower when no sanctions
areineffectthanintheirtreatmentswith(monetaryaswell
as nonmonetary) sanctions.
13. Both monetary and nonmonetary sanctions, when
applied in a setting in which the same agents interact re-
peatedly, can also potentially serve a signaling function
concerning future actions. For example, sanctions can
be used as a warning that the sanctioner might contribute
less in the future unless the sanctioned individual contrib-
utes a sufﬁcient amount. Isaac and Walker (1988) have
shown that unrestricted communication to increase con-
tribution levels. However, previous research has also
established that signaling is not the only motive for sanc-
tioning. Fehr and Gaechter (2000) and Falk et al. (2000)
ﬁnd that monetary sanctions are widely observed in the
last period of a multiperiod interaction as well as when
agents are matched with new agents in each period.
Masclet et al. (2003) observe that nonmonetary sanctions
are also applied when agents are grouped with different
individuals in each period. In these settings, there is no
motive to use punishment as a signal, because the sanc-
tioner does not beneﬁt from any future increase in contri-
butionthesanctioninduces.Furthermore,inthesesettings
with random rematching, receiving either monetary sanc-
tions or nonmonetary sanctions increases the subsequent
contribution level in the next period, indicating that their
positive effects are not restricted to environments with
repeated interaction, and therefore not only due to the sig-
nalling function that the sanctions serve.
658 ECONOMIC INQUIRYOn the other hand, a system of monetary
sanctionsaloneisaveryblunttoolforinducing
cooperation. In MP, the monetary sanction is
theonlyinstrumentforcommunicationaswell
as for punishment. Application of monetary
punishment can increase the contributions of
some individuals whom informal sanctions
cannotinﬂuence. However, because of its cost,
italsoisaninefﬁcientmannerofraisingcontri-
butions of those who would need only social
sanctionstobeinducedtocooperate.Monetary
penalties also appear to engender negative re-
ciprocation in the form of lower contributions
from some sanctioned individuals.
BPallowstheuseofinformalsanctionsatno
costtoboostthecontributionsofthosetheycan
inﬂuence. It also has a system of formal sanc-
tionstopunishandchangethebehaviorofthose
who are insufﬁciently inﬂuenced by informal
sanctions. The combination appears to work
wellingettinghighlevelsofcooperationatmin-
imal cost. It appears that some of the effect of
monetary sanctions in BP is immediate, as
low contributors respond to sanctions with
a net change in contribution in the next period
that is increasing in the sanction received. A
signiﬁcant immediate response could not be




between the two treatments is the existence of
nonmonetarysanctions,theymustbethecause




of punishment, rather than the actual applica-
tion of sanctions.
14
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